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Anatomy'
ofa e town
Figuring out what led to today's economic mess
could hold the best clues for moving forward-and
averting the world's next financial crisis.
By PatrickA. McGuire
SOME CALL IT A BLACK HOLE. OTHERS USE THE MORE SINISTER METAPHOR of "a dark
market." Robert Rhee, an associate professor at the University of Maryland School of Law
who teaches corporate finance and corporate ethics says flatly "so much of the financial
universe out there is unknown territory."
His colleague, Law School Professor Michael Greenberger, the former federal regulator
and now oft-quoted explainer of the economic meltdown for NPR and "60 Minutes,"
speaks of "a shadow market." This is a market, he says, that is understood by few, including
top Wall Street insiders. Many of them, he says, had such little appreciation for the details
of their risky practices that they not only caused unprecedented losses in the national and
world economies, but wiped out tens of millions-in some cases hundreds of millions-
of dollars from their own personal wealth.
"It's crystal clear," says Greenberger, who has testified on Capitol Hill about the financial
meltdown almost a dozen times this year, "that except for some of the people doing the
trading, at the highest levels the CEOs, the top officers absolutely did not understand what
was happening."
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Exactly what was happening?
As policy makers in Washington sift through the debris of de-
railed derivatives and default swaps for answers to that question,
Maryland School of Law faculty such as Greenberger and Rhee
see a common cause for the meltdown.
"The biggest legal aspect to what's happening now is the
lack of regulation and the ineffectiveness of regulations,"
says Rhee. "Aside from that, the larger causal mechanisms of
this crisis remain outside of the law."
An inciting incident that most financial experts now point
to as an immediate cause of the current economic chaos was
the passage in December 2000 of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act. The bill's passage was principally
arranged by Senator Phil Gramm, then chair of the Senate
Banking Committee; it was sent to the floor of both
Houses of Congress as a 262 page rider to an 11,000
page omnibus appropriations bill on the last day of a
lame duck session of Congress on December 15,2000.
The bill was embraced by both sides of the aisle, passed
by wide margins and was signed into law just before Christmas by
President Bill Clinton.
In effect it deregulated the trading of derivatives and default
swaps by telling the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) that they
had virtually no authority at all over them. And yet, according to
Greenberger, there is more investment money today tied up in deriva-
tives than in stocks and bonds.
"Nobody's complaining that stock trading put us in this meltdown,
or that regulated futures trading put us here," says Greenberger, who
served on the CFTC from 1997 to 1999. "It's this dark-market deriv-
ative product, these private, bilateral transactions. Over the counter
derivatives are today a $600 trillion notional value market. We [the
CFTC] thought when it was $27 trillion in 1998 it ought to be regu-
lated. We lost that battle."
Derivatives are not new. Rhee says that derivatives have a Jekyll-
Hyde duality. They can be used to hedge (mitigate) risk, but they can
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also be used to magnify risk-taking. As opposed to an investment in a
commodity itself, a derivative is a bet on the future price of some other
asset or index, such as stock or interest rates. The plainest instruments
are futures and options. While investing in the standard commodity
future remains mostly regulated, newer non-traditional forms such as
credit default swaps are private transactions that are legally traded
"off the books" and subject to almost no official scrutiny.
That the risk-hedging derivative suddenly became an economy-
busting risk of its own derives from its use as a hedge against the failure
of investments in sub-prime mortgage securities. Adding to the problem,
according to a Maryland Law graduate who is now a prominent con-
sultant to the financial industry in regulatory and governance services,
were government policies that overinflated the sub-prime mortgage
market and set the stage for its subsequent collapse.
"The rampage in derivatives was an outgrowth of the Fed's 'easy
money' policies," says Ellyn Brown '80, a current member of the
board of directors of NYSE-Euronext, Inc., the publicly traded entity
that owns and operates the New York Stock Exchange and the pan-
European stock exchange. "The federal legislative and executive
branches' promotion of home ownership as an absolute good was ill
thought-out and mostly uncoordinated," she says. That, and what
she sees as Congressional resistance to adequate oversight of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac.
Brown, the Securities Commissioner for the State of Maryland
from 1987 to 1992, cites economist Robert Samuelson, who "gives
perhaps the most organic explanation of the genesis of today's crisis:
'Taking financial stability for granted, money managers, bankers,
traders, government officials and ordinary investors did things that
destroyed financial stability."
As sub-prime mortgage loans were bundled together and sold as
securities and collateralized debt obligations they, like most loans,
were classified as senior, mezzanine and junior debt. As such they
received credit ratings from organizations such as Moody's and
Standard and Poor's.
"They got Triple A ratings for the most secure senior debt," says
Greenberger, "but that's senior debt of sub-prime mortgages, given
to people who have a high probability of not being able to pay the
loans back. But many of the 'brilliant minds' ignored the underly-
ing risk, and believed they got Triple A and Double A paper and
they believed these were therefore conservative, solid investments
and they sold them as that. People who bought them thought they
were conservative, solid investments, not understanding it was a
Triple A rating of junk."
The frosting on this devil's food cake was the credit default swaps.
Those who granted the sub-prime mortgages, and those who
bought them, took out what was essentially an insurance policy-so
that if the mortgage holder defaulted, the insurance paid back their
investment. Though these policies were often issued by insurance
companies, such as AIG, they were not called insurance because then
they would fall under state insurance regulations, which would have
required capital reserves to support the guarantees. Labeled "credit
default swaps," they were deemed not subject to regulation and there
were no capital requirements. The delusion of safety moved from the
mortgagers to the insurers.
"They thought, 'We're getting premiums for this insurance for
which we will never have to pay anything because there are no
risks," says Greenberger. "It wasn't just AIG. Everyone was issuing
insurance, calling it swaps and not setting aside reserves and it
blew a multi-trillion dollar hole in the economy. They never thought
housing prices would go down. When housing prices went down
the 'insurance' or swap got triggered. But unlike regulated insurance,
they never had to set aside reserves to pay those policies. And
you're talking about a minimum of $25 trillion in insurance with
no capital reserve."
The insurance became the ultimate factor in self-delusion, says
Rhee. "I think the insurance fed into the psychology and affected ex-
ecutive opinions as to how much risk they'd exposed themselves to."
Once the supposed fail-safe factor of sub-prime mortgages-that
housing prices will never fall-actually failed, no one was monitoring
the domino effect of thousands of sub-prime mortgage foreclosures
on other aspects of the economy. Investments thought to have been
without risk now, in hindsight, seem obviously reckless.
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"There has to be a relationship between risk and return," notes
Rhee, a former New York and London investment banker with a
Wharton MBA. "But proper risk taking is where Wall Street fell down."
Rhee worked as a vice president in the investment banking arm
of Swiss Re in New York, as well as an investment banker with UBS
Warburg and Deutchebanc Alex. Brown in Baltimore. He cites the
reorganization of Wall Street firms as a factor that led to their short-
sightedness in assessing risk.
''A while ago," he says, "Wall Street was made up of private com-
panies that had their own capital. And it used to be you were using the
firm's capital so it was preserved in a way that made sense. People had
a greater interest in their stock in the company. The thought was,
'I can't blow up my own firm because a large part of my wealth is tied
up in it."
But, he notes, many of those firms began going public or were
merged with larger commercial banks with large balance sheets.
"Now it's shareholder's capital you're using," says Rhee. "The capital
you can invest is whatever the executive committee or management
will allow you to use in terms of your own trading activities. The
risk-to-return relationship got skewed heavily. It encouraged excessive
risk taking. That explains AIG. It was as if people were saying, 'What
we're doing now is just printing money. The more policies we write,
the more we sell this type of stuff. My year-end bonus will be X million.'
Under those circumstances, people inside that group were probably
getting caught up in this."
It was, he says, a classic house of cards and the incentives were
perverse; even substantially employee-owned firms like Bears Stearns
were not immune to the new psychology of risk taking.
"We were in a bubble. The bubble psychology is that you don't think
you're the person without the seat when the music stops. It's always
going to be someone else. I can't imagine that these bank executives
were immune from that type of psychology.
"Don't forget some of these bank executives had hundreds of millions
invested in their own firms, so if it blew up, it blew up their entire
net worth. It leads me to think they knowingly engaged in excessive
risk taking without knowing how excessive their risk taking really was.
They did not think the risks would be magnified down every chain of
every transaction."
How could supposedly savvy financiers so delude themselves?
Rhee says a former colleague on Wall Street who specializes in
bond insurance, told him recently, "We didn't know X would lead to
Y would lead to Z would lead to A would lead to B. We knew X was
a problem. Or Y was a problem. But we didn't connect all the dots."
Wall Street traders understood the individual problems, says Rhee,
"but there was no one sitting at the top saying, 'Okay, I see the trail
of transactions and if something happens the trail of transactions will
fall in a domino pattern like chis."
In the meantime, a unified strategy for resolving the problem has
remained elusive. Many want to concentrate on and punish villains.
Banks decry talk of new, day-to-day regulatory monitoring and insist
Wall Street be trusted to voluntarily clean up its mess. Reformers want
tough new legislation enacting more restrictive regulations.
President Barack Obama said that the financial crisis has been a
result of "gaps and weaknesses in the supervision and regulation of
financial firms [that] presented challenges to our government's stability
of our financial system." In response, the Obama administration
introduced a proposal in July 2009 to reform the regulation of finan-
cial markets with five key objectives: to promote robust supervision
and regulation of financial firms; establish comprehensive supervision
and regulation of financial markets; protect consumers and investors
from financial abuse; improve tools for managing financial crises;
and raise international regulatory standards and improve interna-
tional cooperation.
Greenberger is concerned that President Barack Obama's objectives
will be undercut by fierce lobbying by Wall Street and that Congress
will only take half-steps toward re-regulation.
"Wall Street is simply calling for a private clearinghouse to be used
by traders on a voluntary basis," he notes. "I say that's not enough.
You have to have mandatory exchange trading for these derivatives so
you have transparency. Not only transparency to the federal regulators,
but to the public as a whole. It gives you an added set of regulatory
tools that are being overlooked."
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Meanwhile, those in the financial services industry caution against
over-regulation.
"As a country we tend to legislate for the last problem and not for
the next," says Christine Edwards '83, former executive vice president
and chief legal officer at Bank One Corporation and now a partner in
Winston & Strawn's corporate practice group who represents clients
in the securities and banking industries on regulatory issues. "Trying
to look forward to determine what is the next meltdown ready to
happen is much more difficult."
The question of too much or too little regulation, she notes, or the
rype of legislation needed right now is less pressing than asking whether
or not the right regulatory structure is in place to clearly inform and
monitor key financial industry players and consumers.
"Do we need to address the duplication of effort between federal
and state regulations?" she asks. "Or should we have a patchwork quilt
of regulations between federal, state, local, certain law enforcement
agencies and federal agencies? Because that's what we have right now."
Brown supports the general idea of regulating for systemic risk "now
that we've actually come face-to-face with the realities of our inter-
locked financial system." However, she says, "We need to think not
only about counterparty risk and all of the relationships that made
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch so vulnerable,
but also to the nature of global systemic risk, across institutions and
markets worldwide."
The entire issue of risk regulation, she says, "is perilous territory-
the danger being that over-regulation will impede the innovation
necessary to grow our economy." By definition, she says, innovation of
any sort requires risk.
"It is one thing for government regulators to be concerned about,
and move to regulate outrageous leverage ratios," says Brown. "It is
quite another thing to ask a regulator to assess the risk inherent in a
new financial product or service. Having been a regulator myself, I
know very well that regulation is a defensive art form. Regulators aren't
out there in the market thinking up new products and services. The
regulators' mission is to prevent problems. Thus, the regulators' incli-
nation is to say 'no' rather than risk being wrong by embracing anything
new and different."
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